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ABSTRACT
What do I need to say to convince you to do something?
This is an important question for an autonomous agent de-
ciding whom to approach for a resource or for an action
to be done. Were similar requests granted from similar
agents in similar circumstances? What arguments were most
persuasive? What are the costs involved in putting cer-
tain arguments forward? In this paper we present an agent
decision-making mechanism where models of other agents
are refined through evidence from past dialogues, and where
these models are used to guide future argumentation strat-
egy. We empirically evaluate our approach to demonstrate
that decision-theoretic and machine learning techniques can
both significantly improve the cumulative utility of dialogi-
cal outcomes, and help to reduce communication overhead.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Multiagent
Systems
General Terms
Algorithms, Experimentation
Keywords
Argumentation, Decision theory, Machine learning, Policies
1. INTRODUCTION
It is typically the case that collaborative activities require
agents (human or artificial) to share resources, act on each
others’ behalf, coordinate individual acts, etc. Agreements
to collaborate are often ad-hoc and temporary in nature but
can develop into more permanent alliances. Regardless of
whether such relationships are transient or permanent, dia-
logue among collaborators that is concerned with the dele-
gation of tasks, or sharing of resources are common.
The formation of agreements may, however, be subject to
policy (or norm) restrictions. Such policies might regulate
what resources may be released to a partner from some other
organisation, under what conditions they may be used, and
what information regarding their use is necessary to make a
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decision. Similarly, policies may govern actions that can be
done either to pursue personal goals or on behalf of another.
One important aspect of collaborative activities is resource
sharing and task delegation [3]. If a plan is not properly
resourced and tasks delegated to appropriately competent
agents then collaboration may fail to achieve shared goals.
We explore in this paper strategies for plan resourcing where
agents operate under policy constraints. This is important
not only for autonomous agents operating on behalf of in-
dividuals or organisations, but also if these agents support
human decision makers in team contexts. To guide strate-
gies regarding whom to approach for a resource and what
arguments to put forward to secure an agreement, agents
require accurate models of other decision makers that may
be able to provide such a resource. The first question ad-
dressed in this research is how we may utilise evidence from
past encounters to develop accurate models of the policies
of others (Section 2).
Given that agents are operating under policies, and some
policies may prohibit an agent from providing a resource to
another under certain circumstances, how can we utilise the
model of others’ policies that have been learned to devise a
strategy for selecting an appropriate provider from a pool
of potential providers? To do this, we propose a decision-
theoretic model, which utilises a model of the policies and
resource availabilities of others to aid in deciding who to talk
to and what information needs to be revealed if some other
collaborator is to provide a resource (Section 3).
In this paper, we demonstrate the utility of our approach
by testing the following hypotheses: (i) decision-theoretic
and machine learning techniques can significantly improve
the cumulative utility of dialogical outcomes; and (ii) this
combination of techniques can help to focus dialogue on per-
tinent issues for negotiation (Section 4).
2. LEARNING POLICIES
The framework we propose here (illustrated in Figure 1)
enables agents to negotiate regarding resource provision, and
use evidence derived from argumentation to build more ac-
curate and stable models of others’ policies. These policy
models, along with models of resource availability also de-
rived from previous encounters, are used to guide dialogi-
cal strategies for resourcing plans. The dialogue manager
handles all communication with other agents. In learning
policies from previous encounters, various machine learning
techniques can be employed; Figure 1 refers to a rule learn-
ing mechanism, but we also investigate instance-based and
decision-tree learning in this paper (Section 2.3). The ar-
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Figure 1: Agent reasoning architecture
guments exchanged during dialogue constitute the evidence
used to learn policies and resource availability. Arguments
refer to features of the task context in which a resource is to
be used, and decisions regarding whether or not a resource
is made available to another agent may depend on such fea-
tures. The plan resourcing strategy mechanism reasons over
policy and resource availability models, and uses decision
theoretic heuristics to select which potential provider yields
the highest expected utility (see Section 3). In order to
model our argumentation-based framework, we begin by for-
mulating a mechanism to capture policies.
2.1 Policies
Agents have policies (aka. norms) that govern how re-
sources are provided to others. In our model, policies are
conditional; they are relevant to an agent’s decision un-
der specific circumstances. These circumstances are char-
acterised by a set of features. Some examples of features
may include: (1) the height of a tower, (2) the temperature
of a room, or (3) the manufacturer of a car.
Definition 1 (Features) Let F be the set of all features
such that f1, f2, . . . ∈ F . We define a feature as a character-
istic of the prevailing circumstance under which an agent is
operating (or carrying out an activity); i.e. the task context.
Our concept of policy maps a set of features into an ap-
propriate policy decision. In our framework, an agent can
make one of two policy decisions, namely (1) grant, which
means that the policy allows the agent to provide the re-
source when requested, and (2) deny, which means that the
policy prohibits the agent from providing the resource.
Definition 2 (Policies) A policy is defined as a function
Π : ~F → {grant, deny}, which maps feature vectors of tasks,
~F , to appropriate policy decisions.
In order to illustrate the way policies are captured in this
model, we present the following examples (see Table 1). As-
suming, f1 is resource, f2 is purpose, f3 is weather report
(with respect to a location), f4 is the affiliation of the agent,
and f5 is the day the resource is required then policies P1,
P2, and P3 (see Table 1) will be interpreted as follows:
P1: You are permitted to release a helicopter (h), to an
agent if the helicopter is required for the purpose of
transporting relief materials (trm).
Table 1: An example policy profile.
Policy Id f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 Decision
P1 h trm grant
P2 h vc deny
P3 j grant
P4 c vc xx grant
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pn q yy w xx z deny
OPEN-
DIALOGUE PROPOSE ACCEPT
CLOSE-
DIALOGUE
REFUSE
COUNTER-
PROPOSE
REJECT
CHALLENGE
ASSERT
QUERY
INFORM
Figure 2: The negotiation protocol.
P2: You are prohibited from releasing a helicopter to an
agent if the weather report says there are volcanic
clouds (vc) in the location the agent intends to deploy
the helicopter.
P3: You are permitted to release a jeep (j) to an agent.
If a helicopter is intended to be deployed in an area with
volcanic clouds then the provider is forbidden from providing
the resource but might offer a ground vehicle (e.g. jeep)
to the seeker if there is no policy prohibiting this and the
resource is available.
2.2 Argumentation-based Negotiation
The protocol employed in this framework, constraining
dialogical moves, is illustrated in Figure 2. Our approach in
this regard is similar to the dialogue for resource negotiation
proposed by McBurney & Parsons [4].
To illustrate the sorts of interaction between agents, con-
sider the example dialogue in Figure 3. Let x and y be
seeker and provider agents respectively. Suppose we have
an argumentation framework that allows agents to ask for
and receive explanations, offer alternatives, or ask for more
information about the attributes of requests, then there is
the potential for x to gather additional evidence regarding
the likely policy rules guiding y concerning provision of re-
sources.
Negotiation for resources takes place in a turn-taking fash-
ion. The dialogue starts when x sends a request (propose
in Figure 2) to y (e.g. line 1, Figure 3). The provider, y,
may respond by conceding to the request (accept), rejecting
it, offer an alternative resource (counter-propose), or ask for
more information (query) such as in line 2 in Figure 3. If
the provider agrees to provide the resource then the nego-
tiation ends. If, however, the provider rejects the proposal
(line 8, Figure 3), then the seeker may challenge that deci-
sion (line 9), and so on. If the provider suggests an alterna-
tive then the seeker evaluates it to see whether it is accept-
able or not. Furthermore, if the provider agent needs more
information from the seeker in order to make a decision, the
# Scenario
1 x: Can I have a helicopter for $0.1M reward?
2 y: What do you need it for?
3 x: To transport relief materials.
4 y: To where?
5 x: A refugee camp near Indonesia.
6 y: Which date?
7 x: On Friday 16/4/2010.
8 y: No, I can’t provide you with a helicopter.
9 x: Why?
10 y: I am not permitted to release a helicopter
in volcanic eruption.
11 x: There is no volcanic eruption near Indonesia.
12 y: I agree, but the ash cloud is spreading, and
weather report advises that it is not safe
to fly on that day.
13 x: Ok, thanks.
14 y: You’re welcome.
Figure 3: Dialogue example.
provider agent would ask questions that will reveal the fea-
tures it requires to make a decision (query, inform/refuse).
There is a cost attached to the revelation of private informa-
tion to other agents. An agent might refuse to reveal a piece
of information if doing so is expensive [7], and this may vary
depending upon who it is revealed to. The negotiation ends
when agreement is reached or all possibilities explored have
been rejected.
Furthermore, since we make the simplifying assumption
that agents communicate truthfully and accurately in this
framework1, the suggestion of an alternative by a provider
could serve as evidence that the provider agent does not
have any policy that forbids the provision of such a resource
to the seeker, and that the resource is also available.
2.3 Learning from dialogue
One of the core goals of this research is to learn mod-
els of the policies of others. When an agent has a collec-
tion of experiences with other agents described by feature
vectors (see Section 2.1), we can make use of existing ma-
chine learning techniques for learning associations between
sets of discrete attributes (i.e. elements of F) and policy de-
cisions. Specifically, we investigate three types of machine
learning algorithms2 [5], namely decision tree learning (using
C4.5), instance-based learning (using k-nearest neighbour),
and rule-based learning (using sequential covering). Figure
4 shows an example decision tree representing a model of the
policies of some other agent learned from interactions with
that agent. Nodes of the decision tree capture features of an
agent’s policy, edges denote feature values, while the leaves
are policy decisions. Similarly, the policy models illustrated
in Figure 1 show the kind of rules learnt using sequential
covering.
The three machine learning algorithms investigated here
have very different properties. Instance-based learning is
useful in this context because it can adapt to and exploit
evidence from dialogical episodes as they accrue. In con-
trast, decision trees and rule learning are not incremental;
the tree or the set of rules must be reassessed periodically
as new evidence is acquired. We define a learning interval,
1While the issue of deception remains an open problem,
some techniques for addressing this assumption have been
investigated [8].
2We use the Weka [10] implementation of these algorithms.
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Figure 4: Example decision tree.
φ, which determines the number of interactions an agent
must engage in before building (or re-building) its policy
model. Once an agent has had φ interactions, the policy
learning process proceeds as follows. For each interaction,
which involves resourcing a task t using provider y, we add
the example (~Fy, grant) or (~Fy, deny) to the training set,
depending on the evidence obtained from the interaction.
The model is then constructed. In this way, an agent may
build a model of the relationship between observable fea-
tures of agents and the policies they are operating under.
Subsequently, when faced with resourcing a new task, the
policy model can be used to obtain a prediction of whether
a particular provider has a policy that permits the provision
of the resource.
Learning mechanisms such as sequential covering have a
number of advantages over instance-based approaches; in
particular, the rules (or trees) learnt are more amenable to
scrutiny by a human decision maker.3 It should be noted,
however, that the framework presented here is agnostic to
the machine learning mechanism employed.
We also adopt a simple, off the shelf, probabilistic ap-
proach to compute the probability of a resource being avail-
able based on past experience, but there are far more so-
phisticated approaches to model resource availability; e.g.
[2].
3. ARGUMENTATION STRATEGIES
Having described how the policies of others can be learned
with the help of evidence derived from argumentation, here
we demonstrate the use of such structures in developing ar-
gumentation strategies for deciding which agent to negotiate
with and what arguments to put forward. Our model takes
into account communication cost and the benefit to be de-
rived from fulfilling a task. Agents attempt to complete
tasks by approaching the most promising provider. Here,
we formalise the decision model developed for this aim; a
model that we empirically evaluate in Section 4.
Let A be a society of agents. In any encounter, agents
play one of two roles: seeker or provider. Let R be the set
of resources such that r1, r2, . . . ∈ R and T be the set of
tasks such that t1, t2, . . . ∈ T , and, as noted above, F is
the set of features of possible task contexts. Each seeker
agent x ∈ A maintains a list of tasks t1, t2, . . . tn ∈ T and
the rewards Ωt1x ,Ω
t2
x , ...Ω
tn
x to be received for fulfilling each
corresponding task. We assume here that tasks are inde-
pendent; in other words, x will receive Ωt1x if t1 is fulfilled
irrespective of the fulfilment of any other task. Further, we
assume that tasks require single resources that can each be
provided by a single agent; i.e. we do not address problems
3Sequential covering does not necessarily find the best or
smallest set of rules, but other, more sophisticated rule in-
duction methods may equally be employed [5].
related to the logical or temporal relationships among tasks
or resources. Providers operate according to a set of policies
that regulate its actions, and (normally) agents act accord-
ing to their policies. For example, a car rental company may
be prohibited from renting out a car if the customer intends
to travel across a country border.
Each seeker agent x ∈ A has a function µrx with signature
A × R × T × 2F →  that computes the utility gained if
x acquires resource r ∈ R from provider y ∈ A in order to
fulfil task t ∈ T , assuming that the information revealed to
y regarding the use of r is F ⊆ F . This F will typically
consist of the information features revealed to persuade y
to provide r within a specific task context. (Although we
focus here on resource provision, the model is equally ap-
plicable to task delegation, where we may define a function
µtx : A× T × 2F →  that computes the utility gained if y
agrees to complete task t for x, assuming that the informa-
tion revealed to y to persuade it to do t is F ⊆ F .)
Generally, agents receive some utility for resourcing a task
and incur costs in providing information, as well as paying
for the resource. In some domains, there may be other ben-
efits to the seeker and/or provider in terms of some kind
of non-monetary transfers between them, but we do not at-
tempt to capture such issues here. Hence, in our case, the
utility of the seeker is simply the reward obtained for re-
sourcing a task minus the cost of the resource and the cost
of revealing information regarding the task context.
Definition 3 (Resource Acquisition Utility) The utility
gained by x in acquiring resource r from y through the rev-
elation of information F is:
µx(y, r, t, F ) = Ω
t
x − (Φry + Costx(F, y))
where Ωtx is the reward received by x for resourcing task t,
Φry is the cost of acquiring r from y (which we assume to be
published by y and independent of the user of the resource),
and Costx(F, y) is the cost of revealing the information fea-
tures contained in F to y (which we define below).
The cost of revealing information to some agent captures
the idea that there is some risk in informing others of, for
example, details of private plans.
Definition 4 (Information Cost) We model the cost of
agent x revealing a single item of information, f ∈ F , to
a specific agent, y ∈ A, through a function: costx : F ×
A → . On the basis of this function, we define the cost of
revealing a set of information F ∈ F to agent y, as the sum
of the cost of each f ∈ F .
Costx(F, y) =
∑
f∈F
costx(f, y)
Cost, therefore, depends on y, but not on the task/resource.
This definition captures a further assumption of the model;
i.e. that information costs are additive. In general, we may
define a cost function Cost′x : 2
F × A → . Such a cost
function, however, will have some impact upon the strate-
gies employed (e.g. if the cost of revealing fj is significantly
higher if fk has already been revealed), but the fundamental
ideas presented in this paper do not depend on this additive
information cost assumption.
Predictions regarding the information that an agent, x,
will need to reveal to y for a resource r to persuade it to
make that resource available is captured in the model that
x has developed of the policies of y. For example, if, through
prior experience, it is predicted that a car rental company
will not rent a car for a trip outside the country, revealing
the fact that the destination of the trip is within the country
will be necessary. Revealing the actual destination may not
be necessary, but the costs incurred in each case may differ.
Let Pr(Permitted |y, r, F ) be the probability that, according
to the policies of y (as learned by x), y is permitted to
provide resource r to x given the information revealed is F .
Predictions about the availability of resources also form
part of the model of other agents; e.g. the probability that
there are cars for rent. Let Pr(Avail|y, r) be the probability
of resource r being available from agent y. These probabil-
ities are captured in the models learned about other agents
from previous encounters.
Definition 5 (Resource Acquisition Probability) A pre-
diction of the likelihood of a resource being acquired from
an agent y can be computed on the basis of predictions of
the policy constraints of y and the availability of r from y:
Pr(Yes|y, r, F ) = Pr(Permitted|y, r, F )× Pr(Avail|y, r)
With these definitions in place, we may now model the
utility that an agent may expect to acquire in approaching
some other agent to resource a task.
Definition 6 (Expected Utility) The utility that an agent,
x, can expect by revealing F to agent y to persuade y to pro-
vide resource r for a task t is computed as follows:
E(x, y, r, t, F ) = µx(y, r, t, F )× Pr(Yes|y, r, F )
At this stage we again utilise the model of resource provider
agents that have been learned from experience. The mod-
els learned also provide the minimal set of information that
needs to be revealed to some agent y about the task con-
text in which some resource r is to be used that maximises
the likelihood of there being no policy constraint that re-
stricts the provision of the resource in that context. This
set of information depends upon the potential provider, y,
the resource being requested, r, and the task context, t. (If,
according to our model, there is no way to convince y to
provide the r in context t, then this is the empty set.)
Definition 7 (Information Function) The information
required for y to make available resource r in task context
t according to x’s model of the policies of y is a function
λx : A×R× T → 2F
Now, we can characterise the optimal agent to approach for
resource r, given an information function λx as the agent
that maximises the expected utility of the encounter:
yopt = arg max
y∈A
E(x, y, r, t, F ) s.t. F = λx(y, r, t)
Our aim here is to support decisions regarding which agent
to approach regarding task resourcing (or equivalently task
performance); an aim that is met through the identification
of yopt . The question remains, however, how the agent seek-
ing a resource presents arguments to the potential provider,
and what arguments to put forward. To this aim, we present
argumentation strategies that focus on minimising commu-
nication overhead (i.e. reducing the number of messages be-
tween agents) and minimising the information communi-
cated (i.e. reducing the cost incurred in revealing informa-
tion). To illustrate these strategies, consider a situation in
which, according to the evaluation made by x (the seeker) of
yopt ’s (the provider’s) policies, λx(yopt , r, t) = {f1, f2, f3, f4}
for resource r used for task t. The costs for revealing each
feature is, as described above, costx(f1, yopt), etc. Using this
situation, in the following sections we discuss 3 strategies:
message minimisation; profit maximisation; and combined.
3.1 Message minimisation
The rationale for the use of this first strategy is for the
seeker agent, x, to resource task, t, as soon as possible. To
this aim, x seeks to minimise the number of messages ex-
changed with potential providers required to release the re-
quired resource, r. The seeker, therefore, reveals all the
information that, according to λx, the provider will require
to release the resource in a single proposal. Since cost is in-
curred when information is revealed, however, this strategy
will, at best, get the baseline utility; i.e. the utility expected
if the provider indeed requires all information predicted to
release the resource.
In the example introduced above, the seeker, x, will send
λx(y, r, t) = {f1, f2, f3, f4} to the provider in one message,
and, if the request is successful, the utility gained will be:
µx(y, r, t, λx(y, r, t)) = Ω
t
x − (Φry + Costx(λx(y, r, t), y))
This strategy ensures minimal messaging overhead if the
seeker has accurate models of the policy and resource avail-
ability of providers.
3.2 Profit maximisation
The rationale for this strategy is to attempt to maximise
the profit acquired in resourcing a task by attempting to re-
duce the information revelation costs in acquiring a resource.
Using this strategy, the agent uses the models of other agents
developed from past encounters to compute confidence val-
ues for each diagnostic information feature (i.e. their per-
suasive power). Suppose that the relative impact on a pos-
itive response from the provider in revealing features from
λx(y, r, t) are f3 > f1, f3 > f2, f1 > f4 and f2 > f4. Using
this information, the agent will inform the potential provider
of these features of the task context in successive messages
according to this order when asked for justification of its
request until agreement is reached (or the request fails).
In the above example, if the most persuasive justification
(feature of the task context) succeeds, it will achieve an out-
come of Ωtx − (Φrx + costx(f3, y)), if further justification is
required either f1 or f2 is used, and so on.
Other strategies are, of course, possible. An immediate
possibility is to order the features to be released on the ba-
sis of cost, or a combination of persuasive power and cost.
Rather than discussing these relatively simple alternatives,
in the following we discuss how such simple strategies could
be combined.
3.3 Combined strategies
The rationale for these combined strategies is to capture
the trade-off between presenting all the features of the task
context in a single message, thereby, minimising communi-
cation, and attempting to extract as much utility as possible
from the encounter (in this case by utilising information re-
garding relative persuasive power). One way of doing this,
is to set a message threshold (a limit to the number of mes-
sages sent to a potential provider), σm. In other words, an
agent can try to maximise utility (using the profit maximis-
Condition Description
RS Random selection
SM Simple memorisation of outcomes
SMMMS SM + message minimising strategy
SMCS(0.5) SM + combined strategy with σc = 0.5
SMCS(0.8) SM + combined strategy with σc = 0.8
SMPMS SM + profit maximising strategy
C4.5 Decision tree algorithm
kNN k-Nearest neighbour- instance based algorithm
SC Sequential covering- rule learning algorithm
SCMMS SC + message minimising strategy
SCCS(0.5) SC + combined strategy with σc = 0.5
SCCS(0.8) SC + combined strategy with σc = 0.8
SCPMS SC + profit maximising strategy
Figure 5: Experimental Conditions
ing strategy) in σm − 1 steps (or messages) and if the infor-
mation revealed is insufficiently persuasive then the agent
reveals all remaining task context features in the final mes-
sage. It is easy to see that when σm is set to 1 then the
agent adopts the message minimisation strategy, and if σm
is set to |λx(y, r, t)| this is equivalent to profit maximisation.
Another way, is to identify the diagnostic features of the
provider’s decision (from the model), and compute the con-
fidence values (persuasive power) for each feature. If the
confidence value of a given feature exceeds some threshold,
σc, then that feature is included in the set of information
that will be revealed first (under the assumption that this
set of features is most likely to persuade the provider to
release the resource). If this does not succeed, the remain-
ing features are revealed according to the profit maximisa-
tion strategy. For example, if f3, f2 and f1 all exceed σc,
these are sent in the first message, providing an outcome of
Ωtx − (Φry + Costx({f1, f2, f3}, y)) if successful, and, if not,
f4 is used in a follow-up message.
Again, other strategies are possible such as computing a
limited number of clusters of features on the basis of their
persuasive power, or clustering by topic (if such background
information is available). Our aim here is not to exhaus-
tively list possible strategies, but to empirically evaluate the
impact of utilising information from the models of others
learned from past encounters to guide decisions regarding
whom to engage in dialogue and what arguments to put for-
ward to secure the provision of a resource (or, equivalently,
a commitment to act). We turn to the evaluation of our
model in the following section.
4. EVALUATION
In evaluating our approach, we implemented an agent soci-
ety where a set of seeker agents interact with a set of provider
agents with regard to resourcing their plans over a number
of runs. Each provider is assigned a set of resources, and
resources are associated with some charge, Φr. Providers
also operate under a set of policy constraints that determine
under what circumstances they are permitted to provide a
resource to a seeker. The evaluation reported in this section
is in two parts. In the first part, we demonstrate that it
is possible to use evidence derived from argumentation to
learn models of others’ policies. To do this, we consider five
experimental conditions in total (i.e. RS, SM, C4.5, kNN,
and SC). These conditions are summarised in Figure 5.
The second part of this evaluation aims to demonstrate
that a careful combination of machine learning and deci-
Figure 6: Policy prediction accuracy.
sion theory can be used to aid agents in choosing who to
partner with, and what information needs to be revealed
in order to persuade the partner to release a resource. In
this evaluation, we consider ten experimental conditions in
total (i.e. SM, SMMMS, SMCS(0.5), SMCS(0.8), SMPMS,
SC, SCMMS, SCCS(0.5), SCCS(0.8), SCPMS). Figure 5 de-
scribes the configurations tested in our experiments.
The scenario involves a team of five software agents (one
seeker and four provider agents) collaborating to complete
a joint activity over a period of three simulated days. There
are five resource types, five locations, and five purposes that
provide the possible task context of the use of a resource
(375 possible task configurations). A task involves the seeker
agent identifying resource needs for a plan and collaborat-
ing with the provider agents to see how that plan can be
resourced. Experiments were conducted with seeker agents
initialised with random models of the policies of provider
agents. 100 runs were conducted in 10 rounds for each case,
and tasks were randomly created during each run from the
possible configurations. In the control condition, the seeker
simply memorises outcomes from past interactions. Since
there is no generalisation in the control condition, the con-
fidence (or prediction accuracy) is 1.0 if there is an exact
match in memory, else the probability is 0.5.
Figure 6 illustrates the performance of five algorithms we
considered in predicting agents’ policies through evidence
derived from argumentation. The results show that sequen-
tial covering (SC), k-nearest neighbour (kNN), decision tree
learner (C4.5) and simple memorisation (SM) consistently
outperform the control condition (random selection, RS).
Furthermore, both SC and kNN consistently outperform
C4.5 and SM. It is interesting to see that, with relatively
small training set, SM performed better than C4.5. This is,
we believe, because the model built by C4.5 overfit the data.
The decision tree was pruned after each set of 100 tasks and
after 300 tasks the accuracy of the C4.5 model rose to about
83% to tie with SM and from then C4.5 performed better
than SM. As we would expect, the average performance of
the RS is in the region of 50%. Out of all the algorithms
investigated here, SC was one of the best performers [1] and
so we use it as the learning algorithm for the remaining parts
of this evaluation. The SC algorithm also has the benefit of
representing models of others’ policies as rules, and hence
are amenable to presentation to human decision makers.
Figure 7 compares the cumulative average utility of the
Figure 7: Cumulative average utility for SC
Figure 8: Cumulative average utility for SM
Figure 9: Cumulative average utility: SC vs. SM
seeker in five conditions, namely: SC, SCMMS, SCCS(0.5),
SCCS(0.8), and SCPMS (see Figure 5). In each of these
cases, rule learning (SC) is used to build models of oth-
ers’ policies. The results show that each of the five condi-
tions evaluated here recorded increase in utility. However,
SCMMS, SCCS(0.5), SCCS(0.8) and SCPMS significantly
and consistently outperform SC. Although it does build a
good policy model, this reduced performance is due to the
absence of the decision-theoretic model for selecting yopt. A
similar comparison was done with five conditions using sim-
Figure 10: Average number of messages for SC
Figure 11: Average number of messages for SM
Figure 12: Average number of messages: SC vs. SM
ple memorisation (SM) and the results show similar patterns
(see Figure 8). However, as shown in Figure 9, the utility
the seeker gained in the SM configuration is small compared
to that gained in scenarios where SC was used. Figure 9
compares the performance of agents that use SC and those
that use SM. Results show that all configurations of SC (e.g.
SCPMS, SC, etc) outperformed SM configurations through-
out the experiment. This poor performance by SM stems
from the fact that the seeker is unable to generalise from a
number of examples; it only uses exact matches. The inabil-
ity to build an accurate model of the policy of others reduces
the effectiveness of the decision-theoretic model. Specifi-
cally, as shown in Figure 9, the lowest utility gained in the
SC condition clearly outperformed the best result recorded
in the SM configuration. This, further confirms our hypoth-
esis that a combination of machine learning and decision
theory will enable agents perform better than when there is
no such combination.
In Figure 10 we plot the average number of messages ex-
changed in the five conditions against the number of tasks,
where the seeker again uses rule learning (SC) to build pol-
icy models. Results show that, as expected, the number of
messages exchanged in SCMMS condition was consistently
and significantly lower than in the other four cases. For
instance, just after 200 tasks, the communication overhead
reduced to between 2 and 3 messages per task. The reason
for this is simply because the seeker is (1) able to make an
informed decision regarding which provider to approach for
a given resource; and (2) able to preempt their information
requirements and thereby present them without having to be
asked. The SCMMS configuration uses a strategy that at-
tempts to reduce the communication overhead by sending all
the information it predicts will persuade the provider in one
message. The SC condition (no argumentation strategy) has
the highest average number of messages, similar to that for
the profit maximising strategy, SCPMS. In the SCPMS case,
the average number of messages is high because the seeker
reveals minimal information in each message throughout the
dialogue, leading to an increased number of messages, partic-
ularly if its policy models are accurate. A similar comparison
was done with the five conditions using memorisation (SM),
and the results show similar patterns in the number mes-
sages exchanged across the cases (see Figure 11). As shown
in Figure 12, the number of messages in SM configurations is
significantly greater that that in the corresponding SC case;
the difference again being the beneficial effect of machine
learning.
The combined strategy conditions with rule learning are
worthy of particular note here. In SCCS(0.5) and SCCS(0.8),
the seeker tries to find a compromise such that the commu-
nication is as low as possible while maximising profit. Both
SCCS(0.5) and SCCS(0.8) require a similar average num-
ber of messages (Figure 10), but, referring back to Figure 7,
SCCS(0.8) returns a cumulative average utility very close
to the SCPMS case. The effect of this strategy is for the
agent to reveal the information that is predicted to be most
important to the provider in making a decision, while re-
vealing other information features of the task context only
when necessary for the negotiation to succeed. In this way,
negotiation is focused on pertinent issues.
Tests of statistical significance were applied to the results
of our evaluation, and they were found to be statistically
significant by t-test with p < 0.05. Furthermore, for all the
pairwise comparisons, the scenarios where machine learn-
ing was combined with decision theory consistently yielded
higher utilities than those with simple memorisation. Simi-
larly, scenarios where the decision-theoretic strategy mech-
anism was utilised constantly outperformed those without
this mechanism. These results confirm our hypotheses; i.e.
exploiting appropriate decision-theoretic and machine learn-
ing techniques can: (1) significantly improve the cumulative
utility of dialogical outcomes; and (2) help to focus dialogue
on pertinent issues for negotiation.
5. DISCUSSION
We started with the question “What do I need to say to
convince you to do something?”, and have presented and
evaluated a model that starts to address this multi-faceted
question. The approach combines argumentation, machine
learning and decision theory to learn underlying social char-
acteristics (e.g. policies/norms) of others and exploit the
models learned to reduce communication overhead and im-
prove strategic outcomes. We believe that this research con-
tributes both to the understanding of argumentation strat-
egy for dialogue among autonomous agents, and to applica-
tions of these techniques in agent support for human decision-
making. In recent research, for example, Sycara et al. [9]
report on a study into how software agents can effectively
support human teams in complex collaborative planning ac-
tivities. One area of support that was identified as impor-
tant in this context is guidance in making policy-compliant
decisions. This prior research focuses on giving guidance
to humans regarding their own policies. An important and
open question, however, is how can agents support humans
in developing models of others’ policies and using these in
decision making? Our work seeks to bridge (part of) this
gap. One of the limitations of the current research in this
regard is due to the nature of the rules learned using sequen-
tial covering. Sequential covering is a greedy algorithm that
does not necessarily find the best or smallest set of rules
to cover the training instances, and further interpretation
may be required if learned policies are to be presented to a
human decision maker. Other techniques such as induction-
based learning may help. In fact, Mozˇina et al. [6] propose
an induction-based machine learning mechanism, ABCN2,
that uses argument structures to guide the process of induc-
ing rules from examples; the arguments being inputs to the
learning process. ABCN2 is an argument-based extension of
CN2 rule learning, which out-performs CN2 in most tasks.
There are, of course, other aspects of our broad question
that are not addressed here, which present interesting av-
enues for future research. In this paper we assume that
the agent seeking to resource its plan makes a single deci-
sion per task about which provider to negotiate with; i.e. it
has one go at resourcing a task. In reality, such a decision
process should be iterative; i.e. if the most promising can-
didate fails to provide the resource, the next most promis-
ing is approached and the sunk cost incurred is taken into
consideration, and so on. Furthermore, as indicated above,
more sophisticated machine learning algorithms may be em-
ployed to build richer models of other agents, and hence
further guide argumentation strategy. One possible avenue
for future research in this regard is the use of background
(or ontological) domain knowledge in machine learning. An
agent could exploit knowledge of concept hierarchies in an
ontology to better guide the learning of others’ policies from
specific instances; e.g. given positive examples of some agent
providing a car and a van, we may assume the agent has no
policy against providing ground vehicles. We believe that
the research reported here, however, offers a solid basis from
which to explore numerous issues of argumentation strategy.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented an agent decision-making
mechanism where models of other agents are refined through
evidence from past dialogues, and where these models are
used to guide future argumentation strategy. Furthermore,
we have empirically evaluated our approach and the results
of our investigations show that decision-theoretic and ma-
chine learning techniques can individually and in combina-
tion significantly improve the cumulative utility of dialog-
ical outcomes, and help to focus dialogue on pertinent is-
sues for negotiation. We also argue that this combination of
techniques can help in developing more robust and adaptive
strategies for advising human decision makers on how a plan
may be resourced (or a task delegated), who to talk to, and
what arguments are most persuasive.
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